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Abstract
Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed
proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about
their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that
the rest of them are likely to declare a lower-than-actual endowment to the responders. In the second
part of the paper, we report on an experiment testing this game. On average, 88.5% of the proposers
understate the actual endowment by 20.5%. Regression analysis shows that a one-dollar gap between
the actual and declared amounts prompts proposers to reduce their oﬀer by 19 cents. However,
responders appear not to take such claims seriously, and thus the frequency of rejections should
increase. The consequence is a net welfare loss, that is specific to such a "free-to-lie" environment.
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1 Introduction
Humans sometimes resort to lies as a tool for leveraging on negotiation power (e.g., Lewicki,
1983; Anton, 1990; Shapiro and Bies, 1994). As noted by Lewicki and Stark (1996, p.77), in a
negotiation context, "lies misinform the opponent, eliminate or obscure the opponent choice
alternatives, or manipulate the perceived costs and benefits of particular choice options open
to the opponent". Clearly, in a world entirely populated by liars, messages would not be
taken seriously by their recipients.1 The ability of these less ethical people to manipulate
the beliefs of others is therefore grounded in the existence of at least some individuals who
have a significant aversion to lying (Kartik et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Kartik, 2009).
There is a growing body of experimental economics literature on lying and deception
that focuses on what motivates individuals to resort to such questionable communication
methods. In this context, players are generally referred to as the Sender (of the message) and
the Receiver. Gneezy (2005) submits an interesting typology of lies with respect to players’
payoﬀs. If the lie, defined as a misrepresentation of reality, brings about an improvement
in both players’ well-being, we have a "Pareto white lie"; if the sender is worse-oﬀ but the
receiver is better-oﬀ, we have "an altruistic white lie". If the sender is better-oﬀ while the
receiver is worse-oﬀ, this is the typical "selfish lie", which Gneezy (2005) acknowledges to
be the most relevant category for many economic events. Taking stock from a two-person
interaction experiment, he shows that a non-negligible number of subjects lie in order to reap
some benefit, even if this involves a loss for their partner in the game; subjects’ inclination
to lie increases the more they have to gain from the lie, and decreases the more the others
will lose from it.
1 Pioneering studies in the analysis of strategic information manipulation were submitted by Crawford and
Sobel (1982) and Sobel (1985). In these papers agents can send misleading messages without a direct cost,
i.e. they can undertake "cheap talk". In equilibrium, the messages do no alter the action of the receiver.
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One important finding of these empirical studies is that humans inherently present some
form of aversion to lying, although its extent can vary greatly from one individual to another.
Lundquist et al. (2009) find that aversion to lying increases with the size of the lie. Erat
and Gneezy (2011) show that a majority of people are reluctant to tell even Pareto white
lies, which suggests that lie aversion is independent of any social preference over outcomes.
Hurkens and Kartick (2009) argue that some people might never lie and others would lie
whenever they prefer the outcome of lying to the outcome of telling the truth (irrespective
of the consequences of the lie). Sánchez-Pagés (2006) analyzes a truth-telling game where
senders and receivers have conflicting goals, and observes that some subjects reject material
incentives to misbehave. There is an open debate on the inner nature of lying costs, some
scholars claiming that people have an inner aversion to telling lies (Vanberg 2008), and others
suggesting that people refrain from lying because they do not like to deceive others (Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006; 2010). Hao and Houser (2010) provide experimental evidence to
support the hypothesis that the only reason many people refrain from lying is to preserve
their image of an honest person, but they willingly turn to lying when their action is hidden.
However, in their experiment too, about 44% of the subjects exhibit an intrinsic preference
for honesty even under secrecy.
In this paper, we aim to study the inner mechanism of misleading communication in the
negotiation context specific to the ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982). In the standard
experimental setup, the two players are often referred to as the Proposer and the Responder.
The Proposer is endowed with an amount of money and must make an oﬀer as how to divide
this sum between them. The Responder can accept the oﬀer, in which case the endowment
is divided as proposed, or reject it, in which case both players receive nothing. The subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium with pure self-interest predicts that responders should accept any
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positive amount, and, knowing this, proposers should make close-to-zero oﬀers. This result
has been invalidated by an impressive number of tests (Roth, 1995). As documented by
Oosterbeek et al. (2004) in a meta-analysis covering 37 papers, on average proposers oﬀer
about 40% of the "pie"; also, about 16% of the oﬀers are rejected.2 These results have been
interpreted as evidence of an inherent concern for fairness concern specific to human beings
(Camerer, 2003).
In order to allow the proposer to send misleading messages, we make sure that the
responder has only imperfect information about the proposer’s endowment.3 The proposer
is then asked to send a message indicating the amount of money received at the outset of the
game; this is unverifiable information for the responder. The proposer’s strategic advantage
over the responder is thus twofold: he makes the first move and has full information about
his position in the game. The responder’s negotiation power stems from his ability to turn
down the oﬀer submitted by the proposer, at a cost for himself. We expect the responder to
reject "unfair" oﬀers; knowing this, the proposer should make oﬀers that the former is likely
to accept.
In the first part of the paper, we develop a simple message model in this ultimatum
framework, building on the theoretical literature on strategic communication with lying costs
(Kartik et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Kartik, 2009). If there are some intrinsically honest
proposers, we show that the others will claim that they received a smaller endowment sim-
ply to push down responders’ expectations about this endowment and hence submit lower
acceptable oﬀers. The trade-oﬀ between lying costs and lying benefits is thus at the heart of
the paper. In the second part of the paper, we implement an experiment where anonymous
2 See Bearden (2001) for an almost exhaustive survey of the literature on this game.
3 Many authors have studied ultimatum games with imperfect information, be it uncertainty or ambiguity
(inter alia, Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Kagel et al. 1996; Güth et al., 1996;
Rapoport and Sundali, 1996; Croson, 1996). A standard result is that proposers make substantially lower
absolute oﬀers as compared to the perfect information case.
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pairs of subjects were asked to play the game described above four times. At the outset of
a given round, the computer chooses the proposer’s endowment from a uniform distribution;
responders know this distribution. The proposers make an oﬀer and send their message. The
empirical results corroborate the theoretical model’s predictions of proposers’ behavior; the
proposers understate the actual amount in 88.5% of messages (by 19% on average). How-
ever, the empirical evidence on responders’ behavior challenges the theoretical model. On
average, they base their accept/reject decision on the oﬀer alone ignoring the message. As
a result, the frequency of rejections, bringing about losses for both parties, is higher than in
a truth-telling context. Probably one important contribution of this paper is to point out
that, at least in this simple interaction, the "free-to-lie environment" is socially ineﬃcient.
Our experiment — combining an ultimatum game with imperfect information and a mes-
sage game — can be seen as an extension of the empirical study by Croson et al. (2003).4
In their paper, pairs of subjects play, four times, an ultimatum game with an outside op-
tion for responders if they reject the proposers’ oﬀer, under various information treatments.
In one treatment, proposers know the size of the pie (actually one of four possible values),
while responders know that it can be anything between two given bounds (responders are
thus subject to decision ambiguity). Croson et al. (2003) also allow for players to exchange
messages and use a dummy variable to record a misleading/true message. In contrast to
their study, in our experiment responders know the statistical distribution of the proposers’
endowment; these amounts are drawn from an almost continuous distribution, an approach
adopted by Rapoport and Sundali (1996). Proposers’ lies are measured by the diﬀerence
between the declared and the actual amount, not by a dummy variable. We can therefore
estimate the "subjective value" of a one-dollar lie, i.e. by how much on average a proposer
4 See also the companion paper (Boles, Croson and Murnighan, 2000).
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reduces his oﬀer each time he understates his endowment by one dollar.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical analysis of the
lying strategy in an ultimatum game with imperfect information. Section 3 introduces the
experiment. The last section presents the conclusion.
2 Theory: the "message game"
2.1 Main assumptions
In this section we aim at analyzing the communication strategy of a Proposer in an ultimatum
game with one-side imperfect information. We consider a pair of players taken at random
from a large population of individuals. Within a basic pair the two players will be referred
to as the Proposer and the Responder. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume
that individuals are identical in everything but their aversion to lying.
At the outset of the game, the proposer gets a cash endowment Y randomly chosen
in the range [0, A] according to an uniform distribution. The responder does not observe
this endowment, but know the statistical distribution. Then the proposer must make two
decisions. He must send a message M to the responder about the value of Y and must make
a cash oﬀer Z, with Z < Y. The message can be true (M = Y ) or false (M 6= Y ). The
responder cannot verify it. At the last stage, the responder who gets the oﬀer Z and the
message M must decide whether to accept or to reject the oﬀer. If he accepts the oﬀer, the
proposer gets (Y − Z) and the responder gets Z; if he rejects the oﬀer, both players get
nothing.
Players aim to maximize their expected utility given their set of feasible strategies. In
this simple model, we assume that — all things equal — players prefer more money to less,
have fairness concerns, and present an aversion to lying, i.e. they dislike misrepresenting
reality.
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For an individual k, lying aversion is represented by a cost Ck that the individual in-
curs whenever he tells a lie; following Lundquist et al. (2009), we admit that this cost is
proportional to the "size of the lie", i.e. the gap between the declared and the true value
of the variable of interest; we can write the total cost as Ck = ck |Y −M | , where ck > 0
is the marginal cost of one-dollar lie. There are two types players with respect to the lying
cost.5 Following the experimental evidence brought by Hurkens and Kartick (2009), Hao
and Houser (2010) or Erat and Gneezy (2011), we admit that a share α of the population is
made of intrinsically honest individuals or "H-type players". For those players, the lying cost
always exceeds the reward they can get from a false message M (in other words, cH is large
enough). All other (1 − α) individuals have a marginal cost cL = c, with c small enough;
they might consider the trade-oﬀ between bearing the cost of a lie (M < Y ) and the gain
from making a lower oﬀer Z.6 We refer to these would-be liars as the "L-type players".
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argued that individuals in a position to compare their own gain
with that of a reference group incurs an utility loss if their gain is below the average income
of the group, what they call "disadvantageous inequality aversion", and can also bear an
utility loss if they have a gain higher than the reference group, what they call "advantageous
inequality aversion". They argue that an individual’s sensibility to advantageous inequality
aversion should be lower than the sensibility to disadvantageous inequality aversion. For
the sake of simplicity, in this paper we assume that the two players in our ultimatum game
are not sensible to advantageous inequality, i.e. they do not suﬀer an utility loss if they
earn more than the other. We also admit that all subjects present the same aversion to
disadvantageous inequality.
The ultimatum game is a two-player interaction. If we use the index k and −k to denote
5 This is the only diﬀerentiating characteristic of individuals in this model.
6 The threshold c˜ separating a honest person from a liar is engodeneous; we will determine it latter on.
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the two persons, and denote their payoﬀs by respectively xk and x−k, the utility function of
individual k can be written as:
Uk(xk) = xk − 1(xk<x−k)v(x−k − xk)− 1lieCk, (1)
where 1(xk<x−k) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if xk < x−k and 0 if else,
parameter v (with v > 0) captures the utility loss related to "disadvantageous inequality" of
individual k and 1lie takes the value 1 if M 6= Y (lie) and 0 in the opposite case (truth).7
For any given x−k, if xk < x−k it turns out that ∂Uk(xk)/∂xk = (1+v); if xk > x−k we have
∂Uk(xk)/∂xk = 1. In both cases, the utility is an increasing function in a player’s own gain.
2.2 Strategies
For sure, for any player k, the game is acceptable if and only if Uk(xk) ≥ 0 :
Uk(xk) ≥ 0⇔ xk ≥
vx−k + 1lieCk
1 + v
(2)
Notice that in our setup only the proposer can issue a wrong message. Since the responder
is not subject to the lie/tell-the-truth choice, the participation constraint for the responder
can be written as:
xk ≥
µ
v
1 + v
¶
x−k.
Denoting by Y the total sum to be shared between the two players, with Y = xk + x−k,
the responder’s participation constraint can be interpreted as a fairness constraint : he will
accept any oﬀer xk providing him with a "fair share" of the pie:
xk ≥ ΦY, with Φ =
µ
v
1 + 2v
¶
∈]0; 0.5[ and dΦ/dv > 0. (3)
Given that the responder does not know Y, his decision to accept or not the allocation will
be based on his expected value of Y contingent upon the signal M issued by the proposer,
denoted by E[Y |M ].
7 This linear form was introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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For a given strategy (M,Z) played by the proposer, the responder’s optimal "pie-sharing
strategy" will be:
Responder pie-sharing strategy
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Accept the oﬀer Z if: Z ≥ ΦE[Y |M ]
Refuse the oﬀer Z if: Z < ΦE[Y |M ]
. (4)
A proposer who aims at maximizing an utility function such as defined in Eq. (1) will make
the smallest oﬀer Z that the responder accepts, to get the largest gain (Y − Z). The best
"pie sharing" strategy for the proposer is thus to oﬀer the lowest acceptable amount by the
responder:
Proposer pie-sharing strategy: Z = ΦE[Y |M ]. (5)
Given that E[Y |M ] ≤ Y and Φ < 0.5, it turns out that Z < (Y − Z) : the proposer is not
subject to adverse inequality. The utility of a proposer utility who receives Y and plays his
best pie-sharing is:
U(Y,Z,M) = Y − Z − c |Y −M |
= Y − ΦE[Y |M ]− c |Y −M | . (6)
A proposer who aims to maximize his utility must decide on the message M that he sends
to the responder, depending on his endowment Y and his type (honest or liar). A honest
proposer will always declare the true amount (M = Y ) and a liar will declare a false amount
(M 6= Y ). We admit that the optimal false message can be written as a (lying) function in
Y , denoted by g(Y ) :
Proposers’ communication strategy:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
M = Y if proposer is H-type
M = g(Y ) if proposer is L-type
. (7)
The lying function presents the following properties:
- g(0) = 0: if the endowment is zero, the message can be only zero (the proposer has no
choice but to tell the truth);
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- for Y > 0, g(Y ) < Y : since the message aims to push down the expected value of Y ,
and lies are costly, the proposer has no incentive to declare an endowment higher than the
actual one;8
- g admits a reciprocal function g−1 on the interval [0, A].
2.3 Equilibrium
Let us denote by f(M |L) (respectively f(M |H)) the conditional distribution of the signal
M given that the proposer is a liar (and respectively a honest person). By application of
Bayes’ theorem for continuous distribution functions, the probability for the responder to be
matched with a L-type proposer who issues a message M is:
Pr[L|M ] = f(M |L) Pr[L]
f(M |L) Pr[L] + f(M |H) Pr[H] . (8)
In equilibrium, the responder should know the lying function g(M); he can infer from the
message M the conditional expectation of Y. If M exceeds g(A), this signal can only be true
(it was sent by a H-type proposer). In the opposite case, if M ≤ g(A), the expected value of
Y given M is :
E[Y |M ] = Pr[L|M ]g−1(M) + {1− Pr[L|M ]}M
=
f(M |L) Pr[L]g−1(M) + f(M |H) Pr[H]M
f(M |L) Pr[L] + f(M |H) Pr[H] . (9)
an expression that acknowledges thatM can be sent either by a honest player (then Y =M),
or by a liar (then Y = g−1(M)). Furthermore, in equilibrium a responder can infer from
the message of a liar the true value of Y , hence in the former expression we can substitute
g−1(M) by Y . Moreover, as Y Ã U(0, A), it turns out that f(M |H) = 1/A and f(M |L) =
8 A quick look to the Bayesian revision of expectations (Eq. 10) shows that an overestimated message
(M > Y ) pushes up the expected income, thus rises the value of the minimum acceptable oﬀer.
9
¯¯
g−10(M)
¯¯
/A. As Pr[H] = α, we get the final expression for the expected Y given M :
E[Y |M ] =
¯¯
g−10(M)
¯¯
(1− α)Y + αM
|g−10(M)| (1− α) + α (10)
Thus the utility of the L-type proposer (Eq. 6) can be written as:
U(Y,Z,M) = Y − Φ
¯¯
g−10(M)
¯¯
(1− α)Y + αM
|g−10(M)| (1− α) + α − c(Y −M). (11)
The optimal announcement strategy for a L-type proposer is to choose the message M that
maximizes utility U(Y,Z,M).
This problem probably presents several equilibria, depending on responders’ beliefs. In
this paper we limit the analysis to the simplest (and also intuitively appealing) case where
responders present linear beliefs:
Responders’ beliefs: g(Y ) = µY, with µ ∈ [0, 1]. (12)
Then g−10(M) = 1/µ and proposer’s utility becomes:
U(Y,Z,M) = Y − Φ
Y
µ (1− α) + αM
1
µ (1− α) + α
− c(Y −M) (13)
= Y − Φ
Y 2
M (1− α) + αM
Y
M (1− α) + α
− c(Y −M) (14)
= Y − Φ
(1− α)Y + αM2Y
(1− α) + αMY
− c(Y −M). (15)
The first order optimality condition:
∂U
∂M
= −Φ
£
(1− α) + αMY
¤
2αMY −
α
Y
h
(1− α)Y + αM2Y
i
£
(1− α) + αMY
¤2 + c = 0. (16)
leads to the optimal value, M .9 The latter is a linear function of the endowment Y ,
consistent with responders’ beliefs:
M =
1
α
⎧
⎨
⎩
"
(1− α)¡
1− cΦ
¢#1/2 − (1− α)
⎫
⎬
⎭Y. (17)
9 Wa can check that ∂2U/∂M2 < 0,∀M.
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Notice that, in equilibrium there is a single value of µ consistent with responders’ beliefs,
defined by:
µ =
1
α
(∙
Φ(1− α)
Φ− c
¸1/2
− (1− α)
)
. (18)
This value exists iif c < Φ (existence condition). We can remark that µ =M/Y is increasing
with c : the smaller the marginal lying cost and the higher the size of the lie.
Furthermore, the equilibrium requires: 0 < µ < 1 :
µ > 0⇐⇒ Φ
Φ− c > (1− α) is always true (19)
µ < 1⇐⇒ c < αΦ (20)
If this last condition is verified, the existence condition (c < Φ) is also fulfilled; thus the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for this equilibrium to exist is:
NSC : c < c˜ = αΦ. (21)
The equilibrium with lies requires that the (1 − α) liars present a marginal cost of lying
below the critical value c˜. Notice that the solution also holds in the special case where liars
present no lying aversion (c = 0). Individuals with a marginal lying cost above c˜ actually
belong to the group of H-type proposers; such a person has no incentive to deviate from the
truth-telling strategy, since the cost of lying would exceed its benefit from making a lower
oﬀer.
We recall that in this theoretical model agents diﬀer only with respect to the (marginal)
lying cost. We have shown that if there are at least some honest persons and for all the others
lying costs are small enough (c < c˜), in equilibrium the latter will systematically understate
Y, i.e. they declare M < Y. Responders adjust their beliefs in keeping with the message; in
equilibrium they accept all oﬀers.10 Thus, compared with a no-lie (or a perfect information)
10 In real interactions, responders might have a diﬀerent aversion to inequality, unknown to the proposer.
If the latter makes his oﬀer according to his expected aversion to inequality of responders, then some oﬀers
can be rejected.
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environment, honest proposers who get Y < g(A) are worse-oﬀ since they must make higher
oﬀers, while liars are better-oﬀ, since they can make lower oﬀers.
3 The Experiment
3.1 Experimental Design
In this section, we report on an experiment where we asked flesh and blood subjects to play
an ultimatum game combined with a message game. The only diﬀerence with the theoretical
model is that we set now a positive lower bound on the amount that can be provided by the
computer. The main steps are listed below (see Appendix for instructions):
Step 1. Proposer gets Y experimental currency units. The endowment Y is picked by
the computer with even chances among integers in the interval [50; 100].
Step 2. He sends a message M to the responder, informing him about the amount Y,
with M ∈ [50; 100]. If M = Y, he tells the truth, if M 6= Y, he lies.
Step 3. He makes an oﬀer Z (with Z ∈ [0;Y ]).
Step 4. Responder gets the messageM and the oﬀer Z. He must decide whether to accept
or reject the oﬀer. If he accepts, the amounts are due; if else, both players get nothing.
The whole procedure was common knowledge. We run three sessions. The first was per-
formed at the Behavioral Research Lab of ESSEC Business School on February 6, 2012, with
a total of 26 participants; two other sessions were performed at the ESC Dijon Experimental
Lab (LESSAC), on February 21, 2012, with 18 participants and on February 23, 2012, with
30 participants. Subjects were recruited from the student population of the schools, who
answered to a call for paid decision experiments. The experimental design was presented
via computer interface and all interactions were computerized. The program was written
in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each subject was assigned at random with a PC terminal.
We make sure that no subject has participated more than once in this experiment. A short
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introductory questionnaire allows to make sure that students understand well the problem.
The roles (proposer/responder) were assigned one for all at the outset of the game, but
players were not informed of their role before each round started. Each proposer played the
game four times against changing anonymous partners (Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993); we
gathered a total of 148 observations (37 independent per round).
We randomly chose one of the four rounds to be paid for real money, at an exchange rate
of 10 euro for 100 experimental currency units.11 The test has lasted for 18 minutes on
average, and players earned 4.80 euros (including a 2 euro fixed participation amount).12
3.2 Results: Proposer behavior
Lying by understating the actual endowment Y appears to be the systematic behavior.
Proposers adopted this strategy in 88.5% of the overall 148 decisions. They told the truth in
8.8% of the cases, and the number did not vary much from one round to another. Subjects
overstated the actual endowment in a very small number of cases (2.7%); this strategy does
not fit well in our theoretical framework. Some misunderstanding of the problem might
explain them, an assumption that seems to be vindicated by the declining number over the
four rounds (from to 2 to 0). Table 1 indicates the distribution of messages per round,
depending on their nature.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All rounds
Total observations 37 37 37 37 148
Truth telling (M = Y ) 3 5 2 3 13
Strategic lies (M < Y ) 32 31 34 34 131
Irrational lies (M > Y ) 2 1 1 0 4
Table 1. The distribution of proposer messages
11 See Laury (2005) for the validity of this approach.
12 Total compensation was higher, since they participated in two other experiments of a diﬀerent nature.
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Table 2 indicates the average endowment (Y ), the average declared endowment (M) and
the average oﬀer (Z) per round and over the four rounds.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All rounds
Av. Y 74.70 (14.19) 78.30 (12.53) 71.84 (14.08) 74.19 (16.19) 74.76 (14.35)
Av. M 60.16 (9.37) 61.78 (9.59) 59.59 (11.76) 60.00 (10.57) 60.39 (10.29)
Av. Z 26.68 (7.38) 28.68 (6.64) 26.11 (9.48) 27.91 (7.45) 27.34 (7.79)
Table 2. Average actual and declared endowment, average oﬀer.
(Standard deviation between brackets)
Table 3 presents three interesting ratios (in percent), taking into account only the strategic
lies (i.e., messages that understate the actual endowment, M < Y ). The second line shows
the average ratio between the claimed and the actual endowment: proposers tend to discount
the actual endowment by 20.5%.13 The third line is the average ratio between the oﬀer and
the actual endowment: on average oﬀers represent 36% of the endowment, in line with other
experiments surveyed by Oosterbeek et al. (2004). The fourth line shows that on average
oﬀers represent 45% of the claimed amount (Z/M).
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All rounds
Nb. obs. 32 31 34 34 131
Av. M/Y 78.86 75.79 81.74 81.16 79.48
Av. Z/Y 34.71 35.69 37.60 36.89 36.26
Av. Z/M 44.24 47.52 45.75 45.69 45.78
Table 3. Understated endowment: Average values of three important ratios
(in percent)
13 If we consider all the messages (including true ones and overstatements), the average discount is 17.64%.
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An examination of the data change from one round to another suggests that the learning
eﬀect is limited, if any. Except the decline in the almost very small number of "irrational
lies" (Table 1), there is no clear trend in the absolute or relative data. More intuition about
the data is brought by Figure 1. This figure shows the pairs of actual (Y ) and declared
(M) endowment, for all subjects, as well as the regression lines (one for each round). The
symbol is specific to the round (there are thus four symbols). While several dots are located
on the 45◦ line (sometimes proposers tell the truth), the huge majority of dots lay below the
line, illustrating the dominant underestimating strategy. The large dispersion of dots would
suggest that individuals are heterogenous with respect to lying aversion.
50
60
70
80
90
100
50 60 70 80 90 100
Y
M
Figure 1: Actual and declared endowment
If responders fully trust proposers, then the half-declared endowment would correspond
to the "fairest" equal split of the amount. Figure 2 is a scatter diagram between oﬀers Z (on
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the vertical axis) and half of the message, 0.5M. The majority of observations are located
either on or below the 45◦ line.
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Figure 2: Half-declared endowment and oﬀer
More insights about the proposer’s behavior can be obtained from a panel data regression
analysis. We keep the notation Z for the oﬀer, Y for the endowment and define LIE = Y −M,
as the diﬀerence between the actual and the declared endowment. The basic "proposer
equation" takes the form:
Zit = c+ θt + aYit + bLIEit + ui + it (22)
where i indexes the player, with i ∈ [1, 37], and t indexes the round, with t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Parameter a captures the relationship between oﬀers and endowment when controlling for
the lie, the parameter b indicates the variation in the oﬀer for a one-dollar lie. Denoting
the common constant by c, the parameter θt denotes a round-specific intercept and would
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capture any group learning eﬀect over the rounds; to avoid colinearity, one round must be
dropped (we choose the first one as the benchmark). The individual specific eﬀect ui captures
individual unobserved heterogeneity, and it is an indiosyncratic error. In a fixed eﬀect (FE)
specification ui are treated as constants over time, in a random eﬀect (RE) model the ui are
treated as random variables rather than fixed constants (furthermore, in the RE approach,
ui and it are assumed to be independent). It is diﬃcult to say which of the two methods
fits best to our model; the RE specification is appealing since the individuals in our test are
a small sample of a much larger population (of student subjects), the FE is interesting, since
it is not clear why individual eﬀects should be uncorrelated with the other regressors. We
therefore provide in Table 4 an estimate of Eq. (22) using both methods.
FE RE
Y 0.317*** 0.334***
LIE −0.140** −0.188***
c 5.029ns 4.407ns
θ2 1.137ns 1.168ns
θ3 0.017ns 0.041ns
θ4 1.356ns 1.348ns
Nb. obs 148 148
R2 − overall 0.22 0.22
σu 4.91 3.84
ρ 0.42 0.31
Proba all ui = 0 0.00 —
Table 4. Proposer oﬀer equation: Estimation output.
(*** stands for significant at 1%, ** stands for significant at 5%, ns for non significant)
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The two models (FE and RE) provide similar qualitative results. A Hausman test con-
firms that individual disturbance terms ui are uncorrelated with the regressors (Chi2(5)=3.18;
p-value = 0.6726), which recommends the RE method.14
The estimated coeﬃcients indicate that, all things equal, for every additional dollar in
endowment, proposers increase their oﬀer by 33 cents; a one-dollar lie would contribute to
reduce the oﬀer by 19 cents.
These findings are consistent with the theoretical model, according to which L-type pro-
posers (i.e., those characterized by a relatively small marginal lying cost) would declare a
smaller than actual endowment, just in order to prompt responders to reduce the expected
endowment (of proposers) and make lower oﬀers. Our results also match those put forward
by Croson et al. (2003) who showed that in presence of imperfect information and lies, for
every additional dollar endowment, proposers raise their oﬀer by 39 cents. They also report
that a lie (as measured by a dummy variable) would reduce the oﬀer by 1.5 dollars.15
Round specific eﬀects are not statistically significant, suggesting that over a small number
of repeated interactions the proposers’ learning eﬀect is limited.
3.3 Results: Responder behavior
Table 5 indicates the basic statistics pertaining to the responder’s decision. On average, the
rejection rate at 24% is slightly higher than usual, but not excessive (Oosterbeek et al. 2004
refer to a rejection rate of 16% on average).
Over the total of 148 observations, the average amount of the accepted oﬀers (29.04) is
higher than the average amount of the rejected oﬀers (21.88). A Mann-Whitney U-test for
14 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test suggests that the RE specification is to be preferred to a
simple OLS regression.
15 In a companion paper (Besancenot, Dubart and Vranceanu, 2012), we study a power-to-take (or demand
ultimatum) game coupled with a similar message game and found that the message senders (responders in
that game) also lie strategically: when they lie, they make less advantageous oﬀers.
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independent observations shows that the diﬀerence between the average of accepted oﬀers
and the average of rejected oﬀers is significant at 5% in rounds 1, 3 and 4 (it is not significant
in round 2).
The same test shows that the average declared endowment (Av. M) in rejected oﬀers is
not statistically diﬀerent from the average declared endowment in accepted oﬀers in any of
the four rounds.
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All rounds
Acceptance rate 0.84 0.76 0.70 0.76 0.76
Av. Z, accepted oﬀers 28.32 29.61 28.96 29.32 29.04
Av. Z, rejected oﬀers 18.17 25.78 19.36 23.56 21.88
Av. M , accepted oﬀers 60.48 62.39 59.54 61.18 60.91
Av. M , rejected oﬀers 58.50 59.89 59.73 56.33 58.69
Av. Z/Y , accepted oﬀers 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.48
Av. Z/Y , rejected oﬀers 0.31 0.43 0.35 0.41 0.38
Table 5. Basic statistics for the responder decision
We also perform a regression of the decision dummy ARD (which takes the value 1 when
the oﬀer is accepted, 0 when rejected) on the oﬀer Z and the declared endowment M :
ARDjt = c+ θt + qZjt + rMjt + uj + jt (23)
where the index j corresponds to a Responder, and t indexes the round. As in the former
regression, θt denotes the round specific eﬀect (to avoid colinearity we omit the first round),
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uj captures the individual heterogeneity and jt is the idiosyncratic error. Given the bino-
mial nature of ARD we implement a probit and logit model, both of them with a random
eﬀect (RE) specification. The output is presented in Table 6, where, for each method, a
first column provides the regression coeﬃcients, and a second column indicates the related
marginal eﬀects.16
Probit RE Logit RE
Coeﬃcient Marginal Coeﬃcient Marginal
M −0.018ns −0.004 −0.03ns −0.004
Z 0.126*** 0.030 0.217*** 0.028
θ2 −0.675ns −0.188 −1.103ns 0.170
θ3 −0.572ns −0.157 −0.984ns 0.149
θ4 −0.640ns −0.177 −1.070ns 0.165
Const −0.877ns — −1.611ns —
Nb. obs. 148 148
Log likelihood −65.30 −65.45
σu 0.64 1.09
ρ 0.29 0.27
Table 6. Responder accept/reject decision equation: Estimation output
(*** stands for significant at less than 1%, ns for non significant)
Like in the Proposer equation, round specific eﬀects are not statistically significant. Re-
sults here too are consistent with findings by Croson et al. (2003): while the oﬀer Z has a
statistically significant impact on the probability to accept an oﬀer, the message M has not.
The estimate of the marginal eﬀects shows that around the average oﬀer, chances to have an
16 A FE logit model provides similar qualitative results.
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oﬀer accepted increase by 3 percentage points for one-dollar increase in the oﬀer Z.
In order to bring some additional intuition to these results, let us perform some rule-of-
thumb calculations. We know that on average a six dollar lie reduces proposers’ oﬀer by one
dollar (Table 4), but this rises the probability of having the oﬀer rejected by responders by 3
percentage points (Table 5). We consider now a L-type proposer with a zero marginal cost of
lying. Let us assume that he gets 75 dollars (the expected value of the uniform distribution
over [50,100]), tells the truth and makes an oﬀer Z = 0.33 ∗ 75 = 25.17 Given the average
rejection rate, his expected payoﬀ is (75 − 25) ∗ 0.76 = 38. Now, if he tells a six dollar lie,
he will reduce his oﬀer by one dollar, from 25 to 24 dollars. For sure, if the probability of
having the oﬀer accepted does not vary, he would make a profit. But since for a smaller oﬀer
the probability to have it accepted declines by 3 percentage points, the expected gain will be
(75− 24) ∗ 0.73 = 37.23. It turns out that in the neiborghood of these average values, a one-
dollar lie brings about an ex post dollar loss to the "unethical" proposer (without counting
any would-be lying cost on top of it). These numbers suggest that in this game proposers
are subject to a form of overconfidence bias: they tend to believe that responders will take
for granted their message, but this does not happen.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied an ultimatum game with uninformed responders and proposers who
can communicate strategically about their endowment, knowing that the responders will not
be able to verify their claim. The theoretical analysis presented in the first section suggests
that while there are at least some honest people in this world, it is worth lying for the others.
More precisely, proposers willing to lie can be expected to understate the actual endowment
17 Here 0.33 is the average share oﬀered by a honest person according to the estimated oﬀer equation (Table
4).
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and make lower oﬀers.
The empirical findings corroborate the predictions of the theoretical model as far as the
proposers are concerned. In 88.5% of the messages, proposers discount their endowment
by 20.5% on average. These lies are systematically associated with lower oﬀers; for every
one-dollar lie, proposers reduce their oﬀer by 19 cents. However, the experiment challenges
the theoretical analysis as far as responders’ are concerned since they do not react as the
proposers expect: the endowments declared by proposers have little impact on their decision
whether to accept/reject the oﬀer. They behave as if the received message is genuine "cheap
talk". Only the amount of the oﬀer itself matters in their decision whether to accept/reject
it: a one-dollar reduction in the oﬀer reduces the acceptance rate by 3 percentage points.
If proposers reduce their oﬀers because they "believe in their own lies", but responders
are skeptical, the final outcome is a net welfare loss, since the frequency of rejected oﬀers
(bringing zero gains for both players) will be higher than in a lie-free environment. In this
simple experiment, attempts to manipulate through lying are detrimental not only to those
who receive the wrong message, but also to those who deliver it. Despite this, the people in
a position to÷ lie do lie; they are probably victims of a self-confidence bias concerning their
ability to cheat.
It is diﬃcult to extend the insights from this simple game to any other form of selfish
lies. However, if further research can show that lying systematically brings about a socially
ineﬃcient outcome, then the emergence of a social norm banning lying would appear as a
natural outcome.
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5 Annex. Instructions
Screen 1. General information
Good Morning,
Thank you for participating to this study.
It presents an interaction between two individuals on how to share a sum of money,
denominated in ECU (for Experimental Currency Units)
Individuals play in pairs, under complete anonymicity, behind the computer screen. Pairs
are rematched at every round. You never play twice with the same player. Identities of the
persons will never be revealed.
At the beginning of the game, one of the two players gets an endowment. He must then
make an oﬀer to the other on how to divide this amount between them. For instance, if he
receives 100 ecus, he can make an oﬀer 10, that is a division 90:10. Then the other player
can either accept this oﬀer or reject it. If accepted, the first player who made the oﬀer keeps
the 90 ecus and the second player who accepted the oﬀer keeps the 10 ecus; if rejected, both
players get nothing. Thus by giving up his own gain, the second player can inflict a loss to
the former.
In this game, the player who receive the oﬀer (Player 2), will never learn the exact
amount received by the first player (Player1). He only knows that the amount is chosen by
the computer, with equal chances, among the integers in the set [50, 100].
Before making his oﬀer, Player 1 must sent a message to Player 2, indicating the amount
he got at that round. Player 2 cannot verify this information (and Player 1 knows this).
Screen 2. Some clarification questions
These questions aim at helping you to better understand the rule of the game, by means
of some fictitious examples.
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1. You are the person who receives the oﬀer (your are therefore Player 2).
Assuming that you know that Player 1 got 100 ecus, if he oﬀer you 25 ecu (75:25), would
you accept this oﬀer ? (Yes/No)
Assuming that you know that Player 1 got 50 ecus, if he oﬀer you 25 ecu (25:25), would
you accept this oﬀer ? (Yes/No)
2. You are the person who makes the oﬀer (you are therefore Player 1)
Assuming that you receive 90 ecus, but Player 2 only knows that you get a sum in the
interval [50, 100],
- What amount would you claim to have obtained ? [...]
- How much money would you oﬀer him ? [...]
Screen 3. The rule of the game
Step 0: At the beginning of the game, Player 1 receives an amount Y draw at random by
the computer in the interval [50, 100]. Every integer has equal chances to be chosen. Player
2 will never learn this amount, but knows that it is draw from the interval [50, 100] with
equal chances.
Step 1. Player 1 oﬀers to Player 2 an amount Z between 0 and Y . He also sends a
message to Player 2, where he makes a statement about his endowment Y .
Step 3. Player 2 learns the oﬀer Z and the message about Y , and decides whether to
accept/reject this oﬀer. If he accepts, he gets Z and Player 1 gets Y − Z, if he rejects this
oﬀer, both players get nothing. Player 2 will not be able to verify the information about the
actual amount received by Player 1.
You will play this game four times in a row. One round chosen at random will be
remunerated in cash, at the exchange rate 100 ECU = 10 euros.
Screen 4a. The decision
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You are Player 1.
Following a random draw by the computer in the interval [50, 100], you get the amount
[Y ].
You must make an oﬀer Z to Player 2, in the interval [0, Y ].
You will also send him a message about the money you got. Player 2 will not be able to
verify your claim.
If at the next stage, Player 2 accepts the oﬀer, you will gain (Y − Z) and he gains Z. If
he rejects your oﬀer, both of you will get zero.
Attention please. Actual decision. For this round, the computer provides you with [...]
ecu. What amount do you declare to Player 2? [...] What oﬀer do you submit to Player 2?
[...]
Screen 4b. The decision
You are Player 2.
At the previous stage, Player 1 got an amount in the interval [...].
He informs you that he got [...] ecus
He makes you an oﬀer of [...] ecus
You must decide whether to accept or not this oﬀer. If you reject this oﬀer, gains of both
of you are zero.
Make your decision now: [Accept] - [Reject]
Screen 5a. Results
Results. You are Player 2. Player 1 proposed [Z]. You accepted / rejected his oﬀer. Your
gain for this round is [Z]/0.
Screen 5b. Results
Results. You are Player 1. You proposed [Z]. Player 2 accepted / rejected your oﬀer.
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Your gain for this round is [Y-Z]/0.
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